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Abstract
The LHC injection process comprises extraction from
the SPS, transfer through the transfer lines TI 2 and TI 8
and finally injection into the LHC in IR2 and IR8. The
nominal intensities foreseen for injection are over an order
of magnitude above the damage limit. Equipment failures
resulting in beam loss will therefore cause severe damage
to the SPS, the transfer lines or the LHC. Effective active
(interlock) and passive (collimator) machine protection is
therefore essential. The consequences of various failures
such as kicker erratics, power converter faults, etc. have
been investigated for beam 2 with particle tracking. A full
aperture model of the transfer line and injection region was
taken into account. The requirements for active protection
by surveillance of key equipment and passive protection
(TCDI, TDI-TCLI) are presented. Consequences for the
commissioning phase of the LHC are discussed in the con-
text of the likely LHC commissioning strategy.
INTRODUCTION
The energy stored in the injected 450 GeV beam is
2.3 MJ. The assumed damage limit for energy deposition
in equipment is 100 J/cc. In terms of losses the damage
limit corresponds to         protons, which is about
5% of an ultimate injected batch.
The aperture in the transfer line is very tight; at many
locations it is smaller than 7 . The available aperture in
the LHC at 450 GeV is assumed to be 7.5 .
Failures like magnet trips, kicker erratics, timing errors,
operator errors, etc. can move the trajectory far outside the
available aperture; some failures change the trajectory dras-
tically in a very short time. During a power converter fault
of the MSE, the extraction septa in the SPS, the trajectory
is moved by 40  in 1 ms.
The different failures are divided into three classes. We
speak of slow failures, if the trajectory is changed by 10
within more than 2-3ms. If the trajectory is changed by this
amount within less than 2-3ms, this failure is called fast
failure. Kicker erratics etc., which change the trajectory by
this amount in s, are called ultra-fast failures.
MACHINE PROTECTION STRATEGY
The most effective strategy for protecting the machine
components is avoiding dangerous situations. Thus differ-
ent procedures and concepts are worked out to minimise
the risk probability for failures. An example is the “beam
presence” condition. It will be explained below.
In the case of failures, protection systems must be in
place. For slow failures surveillance plus interlocking to
inhibit the injection/extraction guarantees sufficient protec-
tion (active protection). Fast and ultra-fast failures can only
be covered by passive protection like collimators and ab-
sorbers. These passive protection devices must be robust
enough to withstand a full injected batch. They are there-
fore made of low-Z materials (C, hBN).
Beam Presence Condition
Injection of high intensity beam (intensity above the
damage limit) into the LHC is only possible if there is al-
ready beam circulating in the LHC. This is the “beam pres-
ence” condition which protects the LHC against many pos-
sible causes for fast beam loss during injection like wrong
settings, LHC magnet trips, etc., [1].
The beam presence flag is based on reliable monitoring
of the SPS and LHC intensity and a hardwired interlock
between the SPS and LHC intensity monitoring systems
and the LHC injection Beam Interlock Controller (BIC).
INJECTION PROTECTION SYSTEMS
In the following the active and passive injection protec-
tion systems are described.
Active Protection - Interlock System
Fig. 1 summarises the hardwired interlocks involved in
the injection process, [2]. The LHC BIC transmits the in-
jection permit to the LHC injection kicker based on the SPS
and LHC intensity and LHC energy from the SLP (safe
LHC parameters). Injection is only possible if the LHC
BIC has the LHC beam permit (status of LHC is OK). The
injection hardware must be in the appropriate status, the
TDI and the transfer line collimators must have correct set-
tings, the LHC equipment must have injection settings, etc.
Extraction from the SPS is only possible if injection into
the LHC is possible or if one the TEDs is in (complica-
tion for LSS4 where besides LHC extraction also CNGS
extraction is possible). Thus the LHC BIC also distributes
the injection permit to the SPS BIC. The extraction per-
mit is transmitted to the SPS extraction kicker by the SPS
BIC based on the SPS hardware status, transfer line status,
fast beam losses in extraction region, etc. Important hard-
wired links to the SPS BIC concern the extraction, like the
bumped beam position at the extraction bumpers, the cur-
rent of the MSE, the girder position of the MSE and the
status of the MKE, the extraction kicker.
The power converter surveillance system is a vital part
of the interlock system. The present power converter
surveillance (PCS) system has a reaction time of 3ms
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Figure 1: Overview of the hardwired interlock system for injection protection.
(ROCS software). A dedicated fast current decay monitor-
ing (FCDM) system could have a reaction time of  1ms.
This system is not in the present baseline, but has shown to
be mandatory (see below).
In addition to hardwired interlocks, software interlocks
are applied. They are much slower than hardware inter-
locks and not necessarily failsafe. They are thus used for
less critical parameters (beam quality, trajectory in transfer
lines,. . . ) and for redundancy.
The software interlocking system is also used to cross-
check reference values. In case of the PCS, the readings of
the surveillance instruments are compared with local refer-
ence values in the local front-ends. Reference values are
machine mode dependent (values plus tolerances depend
on intensity, energy, type of beam, etc.). To avoid errors
like checking the readings against a wrong set of reference
values, the software interlock system compares the local
reference values with central reference values.
Passive Protection - Collimators
Collimation systems can be divided into generic and
dedicated collimation systems. Generic systems protect
tight aperture against any failure upstream, dedicated col-
limation systems protect any aperture downstream against
one particular failure.
The transfer line collimators, the TCDI, shadow the LHC
aperture. The TCDI system is a generic passive protection
system with full phase space coverage against any failure
upstream of the collimation section. The 0Æ-collimator is
also a local protection of the MSI against all upstream fail-
ures.
For kicker failures dedicated collimators are foreseen.
The TDI (injection stopper) and the TCLI protect the LHC
against injection kicker (MKI) failures. The TPSG shad-
ows the MSE coil against extraction kicker (MKE) failures
in the SPS.
The septum magnets at injection (MSI) and extraction
(MSE) do not have any dedicated passive protection de-
vices downstream. Protection against MSE or MSI failures
relies solely on power converter surveillance and interlock-
ing.
TCDI – Transfer Line Collimation
As mentioned above, the main objective of the TCDI
collimators is to protect the LHC and the MSI which are
difficult to replace and only a few spares are available, [3].
They are thus in the last 300m of the transfer lines, within
the matching sections of the lines to the LHC. Their design
is based on the TCS layout (secondary ring collimator) with
1.2 m C jaws, robust enough to withstand the impact of a
full ultimate batch.
The TCDI system is a 3-phase collimation system with 3
collimators per plane. Between two subsequent collimators
there are Æ    Æ phase advance.
The elements downstream of each TCDI have to be
equipped with a 50 cm Fe mask to be locally shielded
against showers generated in the TCDIs in the case of beam
loss. The necessity of local shielding was a result of a
comprehensive FLUKA study of impact scenarios with the
whole geometry of the last 300 m of TI 8 implemented in
FLUKA.
The setting of the TCDI is 4.5 with relatively large tol-
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erances of 1.4  (knowledge of beam axis and beam size,
mechanical tolerances, etc.). The protection level in terms
of maximum possible amplitudes into the LHC was defined
with a Monte-Carlo simulation including all imperfections
like -beating, mismatch from the SPS, tolerances, etc.
The tight setting guarantees maximum amplitudes of 6.9 
leaving the collimation section.
Figure 2: The phase-space coverage of a 3-phase collima-
tion system.
TDI - TCDD - TCLI
The system TDI-TCDD-TCLI protects against MKI fail-
ures [4]. The 4 m long, TDI is located 90Æ downstream of
the MKI and is made of hBN for robustness and protects
against kicker failures on the injected as well as the circu-
lating beam with its two jaws.
FLUKA energy deposition studies showed that a mask is
required to protect the superconducting coils of the separa-
tion dipole D1 from the particle showers generated in the
TDI in a failure case. This mask, TCDD, is 1 m long and
made of Cu. The TCDD avoids damage in any failure case
and prevents quenches in most cases.
In order to complete the protection of the TDI, two aux-
iliary collimators are needed. They are called TCLI and
guarantee coverage of MKI failures in case the phase ad-
vance between the MKI and TDI is not exactly 90Æ or if
the TDI has to be further retracted because of unaccept-
able halo load. They thus enhance the overall flexibility of
the system. Fig. 3 gives an overview of the elements in
the injection region. One of the TCLIs, TCLIB, is close
to the insertion quadrupole Q6 at  	 
   Æ from
the TDI, the other one, TCLIA, is at the downstream end
of the cold separation dipole D1 on the other side of the
insertion at  	    Æ. For TCLIB the TCS design
is used. In the case of TCLIA, where both beams share a
common beam pipe, a special half-jaw design will have to
be applied similar to one of tertiary collimators (TCTs) at
the D1 location.
Figure 3: Overview of the injection region of IR2
SIMULATIONS OF THE OVERALL
PROTECTION LEVEL
The performance of the protection systems was checked
by means of extensive tracking simulations. The criterion
for safe injection into the LHC was: losses on the aperture
are below the 5% damage limit during the whole injection
process.
MKI flash-over simulations
The protection level during an MKI flash-over is de-
fined by the number of particles having an amplitude down-
stream of the chain of protection devices greater than the
cold-bore aperture, as a function of the aperture of the sys-
tem TDI-TCLI [5]. This number is obtained with particle
tracking through the transfer line and the injection region
in the LHC using MAD.
Figure 4: Number of particles getting into the LHC with
amplitudes greater than 7.5  as a function of the protection
setting of TDI and TCLI and of the MKI kick.
A realistic state of the transfer line was defined with a
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Monte-Carlo for the random errors of power converter rip-
ples, line drifts and SPS extraction error. These values were
scaled to give a 95% confidence level for the injection error
at the injection point in the LHC.
The MKI are travelling wave kicker magnets. Depend-
ing on the location of a flash-over in the magnet, the kick
of a single MKI module can have any value in the range
% of its nominal deflection. In the simulation a kick
range from -0.15 to 0.15 mrad was scanned, with the maxi-
mum kick strengths of the range reaching about 
 
at the





was done. The number of particles
above the cold-bore aperture compared to the damage level
in the LHC at injection energy defines the required setting
of the protection devices. Fig. 4 shows the results for such


































Figure 5: Maximum number of particles getting into the
LHC with amplitudes greater than 7.5  as a function of
the protection setting.
Fig.5 summarizes the maximum number of particles into
the LHC with amplitudes greater than 7.5  as a function of
the protection setting for different phase advances between
MKI and TDI and different injection errors. The required
protection setting of the system TDI-TCLI is 6.8  to guar-
antee maximum 5% of the injected batch above 7.5 , the
cold-bore aperture.
Monte-Carlo for single failure tracking
The overall protection level for the present layout of the
protection systems was checked in a Monte-Carlo com-
bined with a particle tracking. The whole injection pro-
cess was simulated - connecting the SPS extraction region,
the transfer line and the injection region in the LHC. The
Monte-Carlo was used to sample different possible states
of the extraction, the line and injection region. The track-
ing then was done with the MAD-X tracking routine for
beam 2. Thus the particles were extracted from the SPS
in LSS4, were transfered through the transfer line TI 8 and
injected into the LHC in IR 8. The last element included in
the tracking is Q6 downstream of TCLIB on the other side
of the insertion.
Mismatch between SPS and transfer line and transfer
line and LHC was randomly chosen between 20%, anti-
correlating vertical and horizontal plane. Random effects
for power converter ripples, misalignments and tilts of ac-
celerator equipment, beam jitter, etc. were included. For
every seed the orbit of the transfer line was corrected to
give a realistic trajectory. All present passive protection
elements were taken into account; they were set to the re-
quired protection setting plus maximum tolerance. A full
aperture model for the transfer line and the injection region
was used.
Faults of all dipole families involved in the injection
process were investigated. Each family was studied with
1000 different seeds and 1000 particles per run (since only
%-level statistics are required to check for damage). For
each run, loss patterns along the line and injection region
were calculated and after the last element of the tracking
the number of particles outside the LHC cold-bore aperture
in phase-space was evaluated. Post-processing routines fi-
nally determined for each magnet family the maximum tol-
erable error in bending angle and the required reaction time
for interlocking the power converter surveillance, see table
1. For the calculation of the required reaction time an ex-
ponential decay of the current is assumed as in the case of
power converter faults (not applicable for kicker magnets).
The output filter at the power converter is not taken into ac-
count. The obtained results hence do not give the real time
of the power converter to reach the maximum tolerable cur-
rent error, but the required reaction time for a safety system
with safety margin.
Table 1: Results of Monte-Carlo for single failure tracking
(PCS = normal power converter surveillance, FCDM = fast
current decay monitoring).
Family Tolerable required covered by




MPLH 0.185 201.0 TCDI PCS
MKE 0.125 - TCDI -
MSE 0.005 0.1 TCDI -
MBHC 0.005 5.1 TCDI PCS/
FCDM
MBHA 0.015 39.4 TCDI PCS
MBI 0.003 2.7 TCDI FCDM
MCIBH 0.630 389.0 TCDI PCS
MBIAH 0.005 13.2 PCS PCS
MBIBV 0.003 39.5 PCS PCS
3MCIAV 0.225 124.0 PCS TCDI
MSI 0.003 3.0 FCDM n/a
Table 1 also states whether the LHC or the transfer line
is protected and which main protection system covers the
fault.
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Discussion of the results – overall protection
level
The results in table 1 show that the LHC is fully pro-
tected, provided an FCDM is implemented for the MSI (for
FCDM see [6]). The requirements for this device resulting
from the simulations are: detect and react to a 0.3% cur-
rent change in less than 2.5ms.
The MBIs and the MBHCs in the transfer lines should
also be equipped with an FCDM system. The required re-
action time for an MBHC trip is 5.1 ms, which is at the
limit for the normal power converter surveillance. For the
MBIs it is only 2.7 ms.
MKE and MSE faults can still cause damage to the trans-
fer line. These failures are not covered by the present pro-
tection system. However, an FCDM is recommended for
the MSE to at least reduce the risk window (to fully cover
MSE faults, a reaction time of 0.1ms is needed).
For all other failures of the studied dipole families both
the transfer line and the LHC are protected. The TCDI
system gives full protection for upstream failures for the
LHC. Failures of magnet families at the end of the line, in
the collimation section, are slow enough to be caught by
the PCS.
Consequences of quadrupole failures have been studied
analytically in [7] and are less severe. Grouped power-
ing failures (e.g. general power cut) and combined failures
(fault of machine protection system plus other failures) will
be investigated in the future.
COMMISSIONING ASPECTS
The protection systems will play a limited role for early
stage LHC commissioning. However, knowledge of in-
jected beam intensity from the SPS is vital to avoid dam-
age. The “safe beam” flag must be working from day one.
Hence the SPS beam intensity monitoring, the link between
the intensity monitor and LHC BIC and the LHC BIC must
be fully functional for commissioning the LHC.
For intensities above the damage limit (  15 nominal
bunches), the whole injection protection system is manda-
tory and must have been commissioned before.
A large part of the commissioning of the machine protec-
tion system can be done without beam. Examples are: LHC
injection BIC plus injection conditions (“safe” beam,. . . )
and data exchange, collimator movement, collimator inter-
locking, FCDM plus interlocking, PCS plus interlocking,
logging, application software, software interlock system,
etc.
For some tests beam is essential, e.g. for the SPS &
LHC safe beam and beam presence conditions, which are
based on BCT measurements. Another example is the
TDI/TCLI/TCDI setting-up and jaw alignment. The full
interlock system must be tested with beam to check for po-
tential problems like EMC on instrumentation etc.
Commissioning of TCDI system
Preparative tests of the system like movement, software,
instrumentation, calibration of potentiometers for position
interlocking, etc. can be done without beam. This para-
graph will deal with the beam based setting-up procedure
for the passive injection protection devices.
The following steps are required for setting-up collima-
tors:
1. finding the beam axis to center the jaws;
2. aligning the jaws with the beam envelope;
3. setting the jaws to the required gap (defining beam
size).
The angular jaw alignment and beam size measurement
for the transfer line collimators is based on a “transmis-
sion measurement”. Two BCTs, one in the SPS and one
downstream of the TCDIs, are needed to define transmis-
sion versus jaw position. As the TCDIs are at the end of
the line, the second BCT has to be in the LHC. There are
no BCTs in the LHC injection regions foreseen so far.
In order to align a jaw, it is fully closed and its ends are
moved into the beam one after the other. The maximum
of the curve - transmission versus angular misalignment -
gives the optimum alignment with the beam, see Fig.6. Fig.
Figure 6: Simulation results for transmission versus angu-
lar misalignment. Realistic parameters and tolerances were
taken into account.
6 shows the result of a simulation of the measurement pro-
cess with realistic parameters and tolerances. The attain-
able accuracy predicted by the simulation for the angular
misalignment is  R.M.S.
The method of using a transmission measurement for
aligning collimator jaws was tested experimentally during
the TI 8 commissioning. The TCS collimator installed in
TT40 for a robustness test was used for this purpose, which
served as a proof-of-principle. A change of the angular
misalignment had an obvious effect on the transmission.
Those measurement results in Fig. 7, which are highlighted
by the circle, show changes of the angular misalignment in
steps of half a nominal .
The required beam intensity is maximum     de-
pending on the BCT resolution. The impact on the LHC
for setting-up the TCDI would be “inject - TDI dump” in
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Figure 7: Experimental results of transmission measure-
ment for different collimator jaw positions during the TI 8
commissioning.
case an additional BCT is available close to the MKI in the
injection region. The alternative would be to operate in the
“inject - dump”-mode or “inject plus several turns” and use
a BCT in IR4.
Commissioning of TDI-TCLI system
The setting-up method of the TDI and the collimators
TCLI is similar to the method developed for the TCDI with
the difference that for some of the measurements circulat-
ing beam can be used.
The beam axis at the TDI and TCLI locations is mea-
sured with circulating pilot beam. The jaw alignment is
done according to the TCDI method with “inject-dump”
mode. The required intensities for the alignment again
depend on the resolution of the BCT in IR4 (maximum
  
 ). The beam size measurement is finally done with
circulating pilot (or maximum    ) using a transmis-
sion measurement. Each jaw is moved through the beam
and the transverse beam profile is reconstituted from the
surviving beam intensity versus the jaw position.
CONCLUSION
With the nominal injected beam energy and intensity,
machine protection is vital during the whole injection pro-
cess. The “beam presence” criterion prevents many failures
during the injection into the LHC.
The machine protection system will play a limited role
during commissioning of the LHC and early LHC opera-
tion with low intensity beam, but must be correctly com-
missioned during the early stages. The “safe beam” flag
must be fully operational from day one.
Comprehensive tracking simulations were used to de-
fine protection systems and to check the protection level.
Results of these simulations show that the LHC is fully
protected with the foreseen protection system, provided an
FCDM is implemented for the MSI (specification: measure
0.3% current change in 2.5ms). At present the protection
system cannot fully exclude transfer line damage. Simula-
tions will be extended to grouped and combined failures.
Commissioning of the injection protection system is be-
ing prepared. Methods for setting up passive protection
systems have already been worked out.
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